Built so your chats stay yours
In plain words
Imagine a sealed letter that only the person you write to can open. Symbolon is built to work like that:
- Locked messages. Whatever you send is locked on your own computer and is built so that it can only be unlocked by the Symbolon of the people in the chat.
- No company in the middle. Most chat apps pass your messages through a company's servers; Symbolon has no servers. Your computer talks to your friend's computer through Tor, a network run by volunteers around the world.
- Your address stays hidden from your friends. Tor passes the message through several relays, like an envelope handed from person to person, and it is designed so that no single relay knows both who wrote it and who it is for. Your friend does not learn your IP address through Symbolon. That is your computer's “address” on the internet.
- You can check it is really them. Your friend tells you their safety code, a long code, by phone or in person, and you type in the whole code. If it does not match, the contact is not added.
- Your chats are locked on your computer too. If you forget your password, nobody can open your chats, not even us. The password is yours alone, so keep it somewhere safe.
Three habits to get the most from it
- Compare the whole safety code with your friend, on the phone or in person.
- Choose a password of a few unrelated words, at least 10 characters, and keep it somewhere safe.
- Get Symbolon from this website or from someone you trust, and check its SHA-256 against the Download page.
Good to know
No program does everything, and we want you to know exactly what to expect:
- Your internet provider can see that you use Tor (not what your messages say).
- Symbolon needs a computer you control: it cannot help if someone uses it unlocked or if it has a virus. Keep Windows up to date and lock your computer when you step away.
- Whatever you send, your friend can keep, copy or screenshot, so send to people you trust.
- If, in another program (for example a browser), you open a file or link someone sent you, that program connects without Tor and can reveal your IP address. Open only what you expect.
- If someone you talk to can also watch your internet connection (for example an employer's network or the authorities), they may be able to tell it is you.
- For a message to arrive, you both must be online; whatever has not been sent waits on your computer until you connect.
- No independent expert has checked Symbolon yet. If your safety depends on your privacy, do not rely on it; see the end of this page.
For those who want the technical details
The sections below describe the exact standards and settings. You do not need to read them to use Symbolon, but they are here for anyone who would like to judge for themselves.
Technical summary
Symbolon is built so that messages and files can be read only by the people in the chat, and so that your IP address reaches neither your contacts nor any server run by the author. It uses established standards and libraries; it does not invent its own encryption algorithms.
It is provided free of charge, with no promise of security, anonymity or delivery (see the Terms), and it has not yet been audited by independent experts. Below we describe how it is built and where its limits are, so you can judge for yourself.
How messages and files are encrypted
Every chat is end-to-end encrypted with the MLS standard (Messaging Layer Security, RFC 9420), through the OpenMLS library. The cipher suite is MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519: X25519 key agreement, AES-128-GCM encryption, SHA-256 hashing and Ed25519 signatures.
- Messages and file pieces (64 KiB each) are sent as encrypted MLS messages. At the end the SHA-256 of the whole file is checked.
- MLS is designed to keep renewing its keys, so that exposing one key does not open older intercepted traffic (forward secrecy) and security recovers after an exposure (post-compromise security). In 1:1 chats the keys are renewed about weekly when both sides run this version. These are properties of the protocol, not a promise for every case. Your chat history is kept in your profile, so anyone who unlocks the profile can read it.
- Encrypted messages are padded to a multiple of 256 bytes, so their size does not reveal the exact length of the text.
How you know you are talking to the right person
Each device has its own Ed25519 identity key. The “safety code” is a SHA-256 fingerprint of the public key. When you add a contact you compare the code with the person themselves, face to face or by phone, not through the invitation. If it does not match, the contact is not added.
This protects you from someone impersonating the other person or altering the invitation, as long as the comparison really happens over a different channel. For contacts you open from inside a group, the expected code comes from the group's member list, not from a person, so they are only as trustworthy as the group.
How your IP address is kept from your contacts
There is no server in the middle. Each profile has a private onion address (a Tor v3 onion service) and your contacts connect to it through the Tor network, which is run by volunteers. Your contact talks to the onion address, not to your IP, and the other way round. The author runs no server for the app and is not on the path.
The program includes Tor 0.4.9.14 and checks that the file has the expected SHA-256 before starting it. It configures Tor as follows:
- client only: it is not a relay and not an exit;
- the local SOCKS port accepts onion addresses only; the program makes no DNS requests and no direct connections, and if Tor is unavailable it connects nowhere (there is a test for this);
- connections to different contacts never share a Tor circuit (to the same contact they may share one during a session);
- the onion address key is kept encrypted inside your profile.
Someone who sees only your own connection, such as your internet provider, sees that you use Tor and how much traffic you have, not the content. The first Tor relay you connect to sees your IP address, but not whom you talk to. Tor is designed so that it is not visible whom you are communicating with.
How your data is protected on your computer
The profile (contacts, keys, chats, messages waiting to be sent) is stored in the profile folder next to Symbolon.exe. Your password goes through PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with 600,000 rounds and unlocks a random 256-bit master key. That key seals the state kept by the encryption helper (XChaCha20-Poly1305) and the program's own files (AES-GCM). If a file is altered, opening it fails instead of carrying on.
The password cannot be recovered. Against someone who obtains the folder, protection depends mostly on your password: prefer a few unrelated words, at least 10 characters.
Where the limits are, honestly
- Your internet provider or network may see that you use Tor. Bridges are not supported.
- Tor does not protect against someone who can watch traffic at both ends and match the timing.
- Your onion address stays the same and your contacts and the members of your groups know it; they can tell when you are online. The connection is direct: for a message to arrive you both must be online, and what has not been sent waits on your computer.
- If your computer has malware (for example a keylogger) or someone uses your unlocked profile, encryption does not help. Symbolon does not protect a compromised computer.
- The recipient can keep, copy, screenshot or forward whatever you send. There are no disappearing messages.
- If you copy messages or invitations, they go onto the Windows clipboard, whose history or sync may keep them.
- Files you save to your Downloads folder are ordinary files and are not locked with your password. The program also leaves traces on the computer (for example in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Symbolon) showing that it has been run.
- The program is not code-signed. Download it from the right place and check the SHA-256. Code obfuscation of the executable is not a security measure.
- It has not been audited by independent experts. We have tested it ourselves, for example that altered data, forged messages and a rolled-back state are rejected; that is no substitute for an independent audit.
Practical tips
- Compare the whole safety code with the person face to face or by phone.
- Choose a strong password and keep it somewhere safe; it cannot be recovered.
- Keep Windows and your security software up to date.
- Never send anyone your profile folder. To give Symbolon to someone, send the zip.
If your privacy is a matter of safety
If your safety, freedom or job depends on your privacy, do not rely on a program that has not been independently audited. Ask a digital-security organisation for advice.